School Custodian Acted Within The Scope of His Employment When Driving From Coffee Shop to School

The issue of when an employee is or is not acting within the scope of employment is a critical issue in a wide variety of employment litigation. The Washington Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue in the context of Washington’s claim filing statute, RCW 4.96.020(4). The statute provides that claimants wishing to file suit against a government entity or its employees must first file a claim notice with that entity at least 60 days before filing suit.

Daryl Imm served as a custodian for the Snoqualmie Valley School District. His job entailed driving a district-owned truck between four different schools to perform various tasks. Imm regularly took a district-approved coffee break at the “Town Pump,” along with several fellow district maintenance employees. One day, after his coffee break, while driving from the Town Pump to his next school, the district-owned truck slid across a patch of black ice and collided with plaintiff’s car.

Plaintiff brought suit against Imm and the school district. Imm and the district moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to file the requisite claim notice before filing suit. After the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment, plaintiff appealed, claiming that Imm was not acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident and, therefore, the claim notice statute did not apply to claims against Imm.

The Washington Court of Appeals undertook an extensive analysis of the scope of employment. As the Court of Appeals explained, an employee is generally acting within the scope of employment when “engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer’s interests,” but the scope of employment also extends to “conduct [which] should have been fairly foreseen from the nature of the employment and the duties relating to it.” In light of the fact that Imm was travelling from the regular, employer-approved location of his paid coffee break to one of his schools at the time of the accident, the Court of Appeals determined that he was acting within the scope of employment at the time the district-owned truck collided with the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of summary judgment.

Melin-Schilling v. Imm, No. 61921-7-1 (Wn. Ct. App. Div. 1, April 13, 2009)
 

School Custodian's Claim For Emotional Distress Not Barred By Washington's Industrial Insurance Act

A student at Lakeside High School attempted to bomb the school, then committed suicide. The school principal, district superintendant, and other supervisory personnel ordered school custodian Debbie Rothwell to perform various tasks to clean up the scene. Ms. Rothwell found the work particularly disturbing because she knew the student personally.

First, school officials required Ms. Rothwell to work from 1:30 p.m. until 4:15 a.m. the next morning performing tasks such as: (1) cleaning up the scene of the suicide, including “needles, plastic gloves, brain matter, bone bits and blood”; (2) searching for bombs; and (3) cleaning up the area in which bombs had been detonated. Next, school officials required Rothwell to return to work just over three hours later, at 7:30 a.m., to handout cookies and coffee to grieving students, parents, and staff. In the following days, school officials ordered Rothwell to clean up the candles and cards that grieving community members set up each day as a memorial.

Rothwell filed suit against the district and the superintendant, claiming she suffered physical and emotional distress as a result of having to perform cleaning tasks related to the student’s death. The district moved to dismiss Rothwell’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim, and the trial court granted the motion, finding the Washington State Industrial Insurance Act bars such claims.

On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals explained that Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act, RCW 51.04.010 et seq., generally renders workers’ compensation the sole remedy for employees who suffer injuries or develop occupational disease in the course of employment. While stress “resulting from exposure to a single traumatic event” constitutes a covered injury under the Act, “claims based on mental conditions or mental disabilities caused by stress do not fall within the definition of occupational disease.”

Rothwell allegedly suffered PTSD as a result of several events, rather than a single event, and her symptoms did not occur immediately after traumatic event, but over a period of time thereafter. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found that Rothwell’s condition did not constitute an injury or occupational disease. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, allowing Rothwell’s claims to proceed.

Rothwell v. Nine Mile Fall Sch. Dist., No. 26876-4 (Wn. Ct. App. Div. 3, April 29, 2009)