Northwest Education Law Blog : Northwest Education Lawyer & Attorney : Williams Kastner Law Firm : Tacoma, Seattle, Portland

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On March 18, 2010, Imagine Schools, Inc. and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) entered a proposed consent decree with a Missouri federal district court to resolve the EEOC’s claims of pregnancy discrimination against Imagine Schools.

The EEOC filed suit against Imagine Schools alleging that when the company closed down an existing Missouri charter school, then reopened a new charter school known as Renaissance Academy on the same site, Imagine Schools refused to rehire two employees of the predecessor charter school because they were pregnant. The employees at issue, LuShonda Smith and Charity Brooks, later intervened in the lawsuit with their own counsel.

Under the terms of the two-year consent decree, Imagine Schools denies liability, but agrees to pay LuShonda Smith $295,000 and Charity Brooks $275,000 to resolve the dispute. In addition, the consent decree requires Imagine Schools to institute new anti-discrimination policies related to pregnancy discrimination, and further requires Imagine Schools to provide its staff with anti-discrimination training and report to the EEOC on its progress. Commenting on the consent decree in a press release, the EEOC declared: “There is no excuse for a company in the business of educating children to discriminate against pregnant women. . . . We are pleased that Imagine Schools is now setting a good example for today’s youth by recognizing that working mothers deserve the same opportunities as all other employees.”
 

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held on January 4, 2010, that a charter school’s alleged conduct did not satisfy the “state actor” requirement for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim in Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010).

The lawsuit revolved around plaintiff Michael Caviness, who had served as a teacher and track coach at Horizon Community Learning Center in Phoenix, Arizona for six years. A female student enamored of Caviness, and angered by his relationship with his adult girlfriend, filed a grievance falsely alleging Caviness maintained an inappropriate relationship with the student. Horizon placed Caviness on paid administrative leave pending investigation, and during that leave prohibited Caviness from attending track meets. While the investigation largely cleared Caviness, the school deemed Caviness’s telephone calls with the student inappropriate and, as a result, chose not to renew Caviness’s contract. When Caviness sought new employment at another school, Horizon refused to provide affirmative references.

Caviness filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging Horizon, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a protected interest in finding employment by making false statements to potential employers, and further deprived him of First Amendment rights by prohibiting his attendance at track meets during the paid administrative leave. Section 1983 claims require a state actor. For private defendants, that requirement may be met where there is such a close nexus between the state and the challenged action that the private entity’s action must be treated as an act of the state itself.

The trial court dismissed Caviness’s claims for failure to satisfy the state actor requirement, and Caviness appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, holding Caviness failed to demonstrate sufficient nexus between the state and the alleged actions by Horizon. Despite the fact that Arizona law deems charter schools public schools, and despite the fact that several Arizona statutes regulated charter schools’ personnel policies, Horizon’s actions did not constitute state action under Section 1983.