A United States District Court judge argued that accrediting agencies should be “afforded great deference in their interpretation of their substantive rules,” when he recently upheld an agency’s decision to strip a small Presbyterian college of its accreditation as a result of the significant debt the institution has accumulated. St. Andrews Presbyterian College, an institution of about 800 students in rural North Carolina, sued the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools in late 2007, arguing that the accrediting agency “denied it common law due process” and that the agency “failed to follow its own procedures in removing St. Andrews’ accreditation.”
SACS had placed the college on warning and probation prior to its 2007 decision to remove accreditation, advising St. Andrews’ officials that their institution was not in compliance with certain aspects of the agency’s “Principles of Accreditation.” Namely, the accreditor found that the college did not have “a sound financial base and demonstrated financial stability.” Students can receive federal student aid only if they attend colleges that are accredited, and St. Andrews has managed to maintain eligibility only because of its lawsuit.
Throughout the process leading to its loss of accreditation, St. Andrews officials argued that SACS did not provide adequate notice of its compliance requirements, calling them “so vague that they give no notice to the college as to what it must do to bring itself in compliance.” Officials further argued that the institution was not offered any benchmarks to determine compliance, referring to SACS’s standards as a “moving target” determined by the “subjective opinions of varying peer evaluators.”
SACS officials, on the other hand, argued that even though the agency’s requirement that all institutions have a “sound financial base” and a “demonstrated financial stability” are not determined by objective criteria, the agency’s standards are anything but “vague.” They further stated that it would be “unwise to adopt a universal definition for financial stability,” given the “wide variety of institutions” SACS accredits.
United Stated District Court Judge William S. Duffey, Jr., of the Northern District of Georgia, writes in his opinion that accrediting agencies like SACS “are to be afforded great deference” in their rulings and that “these interpretations should be upheld unless ‘clearly erroneous.’ ” He further notes that “the weight of authority” allows SACS to “maintain flexible standards” to evaluate myriad institutions. Dismissing the arguments of St. Andrews, Duffey states that “SACS’ compliance requirements are not impermissibly unspecific” but “provide sufficient notice to member institutions and thus do not violate common law due process standards.”
Elsewhere in his ruling, Duffey backs away from judicial review of SACS’ decisions again by noting that its “interpretation of its requirements for financial stability and a sound financial base is entitled to deference.” He emphasizes a hand-off approach when the court considers accreditation cases. “The court will not act as a ‘super-accreditation’ body to evaluate whether SACS’ accreditation decision was right or wrong, or whether the court would have ultimately reached a different conclusion,” Duffey writes. “The court necessarily concludes the process was fundamentally fair and that the college was allowed to present sufficiently complete information about its financial condition and operations. That St. Andrews disagrees with SACS’ conclusions and determination does not demonstrate that it was denied due process.” [Inside Higher Ed]
