Sixth Circuit Rules Michigan Religious School Teacher is Not a "Ministerial Employee" Under the ADA
On March 9, 2010, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a former teacher at a religious school was not a “ministerial employee” for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Thus, the court held that the EEOC and the teacher could pursue claims for disability discrimination and retaliation against the employer under the ADA and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, a Michigan state law that is substantively similar to the ADA.
As a starting point, the ADA prohibits an employer with fifteen or more employees from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of that disability with respect to conditions of employment. The ADA also contains an anti-retaliation provision, which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because that individual opposed an act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or asserted a claim under the ADA.
However, the ADA’s coverage is not absolute, and there are some gaps in the protection it affords. One such gap in protection is the “ministerial exception,” which allows religious entities to give preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion and to require all employees to conform to the religious tenants of the organization. Thus, an individual’s discrimination or retaliation claim will be barred under the ministerial exception if (1) the employer is a religious institution, and (2) the employee is a ministerial employee.
In this case, Cheryl Perich was a “called teacher” at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (“Hosanna-Tabor”). Called teachers were one of two types of teachers employed at the school, the other type being contract teachers. Called teachers differed from contract teachers in that called teachers had completed certain classes in the Christian faith, were admitted to the teaching ministry, and were hired on an open-ended basis rather than on a one-year renewable term. Putting the classification aside, Perich’s duties as a called teacher were identical to the duties she had previously performed as a contract teacher at the school.
The parties did not dispute that Hosanna-Tabor was a “religious institution,” so the key issue on appeal was whether Perich was a “ministerial employee” for purposes of the ADA. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Perich was not a ministerial employee.
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit noted that whether an employee is ministerial is determined by looking at the employee’s primary duties. Here, the court found that Perich’s primary duties were not religious in nature–she spent only 45 minutes of the seven hour school day devoted to religion. She taught secular subjects and rarely introduced religion into secular discussions, and her duties as a called teacher were identical to those she had performed as a contract teacher. Thus, the court held that excluding Perich from coverage under the ADA would be both “illogical and contrary to the intention behind the exception.”
